Friday, April 7, 2006

Will Alcohol Stop The Spread Of Herpes



Today I received to my letter of 27./28.2.2006 lot of feedback. These range from approval to "relatively nonsense." In addition, I have received many ideas and suggestions from Nial Moores (South Korea) and Dr. Martin Williams (Hong Kong), after which a more nuanced Picture can be drawn.

My reply must therefore unfortunately be a little more detail.

the critical opinions is that of Wolfgang Fiedler of the Ornithological Radolf-cell on the rest. I would therefore like to reproduce below, also the discus-sion as transparent as possible to continue (quote):

  Moreover, I can but in the current outbreak patterns quite 
About once immune-related gene with the migration event. Although nowhere in
all cases, but it's not to be expected that the virus only
used one or the other vehicle. I look at the Steiof (BirdLife, LBV-...)
arguments, some problems:
1) "within .. neither Asia nor from Asia to Europe, there are migration routes between-affected areas." This is incorrect. The trail follows the virus from the Chinese coast in the fall bird migration Indoasiatischen room. About one intermediate stage in the South Asian region (Herbstzg - winter - spring migration) can be explained by the westward movement. And the spatial and even temporal coincidence (including compliance with the Vi-rentyp) on the stage of South-West Siberia to the Black Sea region can not be over-Hen. No doubt there are also a number not so explainable way of the virus, but it would be incorrect to say that there is absolutely no match. I am due to the-time outbreak pattern convinced that we must all say goodbye to the assumption that the arrival of the virus in the field (carried by a wild bird) at a particular point is inevitable and timely conduct there rules to be perceptible mass mortality of wild birds must. Thus, many outbreaks have on the temporal axis simply did not explain. That means, however, that the westward migration of several Zugpe RIOD away entirely conceivable is not that at each node of the imaginary mass extinction cascade must immediately be registered. Who are the images of heavily made present to the north on range-breeding season-ring records of ringed ducks in winter quarters, understands what I mean by the potential for East-West migration.

2) "Most of the birds die on the spot." This assumption is twofold probably not as durable: first, there is now work that holyday show in Asia for chickens highly pathogenic H5N1 in apparently healthy wild birds (ducks, willow sparrow) (although very small numbers, but we do not know how the high density of such vectors must be, for example, to provoke an outbreak in a water bird area). Second, this assumption would mean that must have been in Vienna, on Rügen, on Lake Constance, Lake Geneva, in Wolfratshausen, Lech, Sweden and France respectively transported to the site within the three weeks before the outbreak of the virus from bird flu areas. Corresponding migratory movements, we can exclude and poultry products or mist, which were in all these places within a very short time and released simultaneously transported to the site are available as an alternative hypothesis as implausible.


3) "... that in countries with strict import controls No avian influenza occurs ...": That is the case for Australia (and New Zealand) and is thus really a good argument against the private mitiveren forms of migratory vectors hypothesis is (but with the slight restriction effect that probably only . get very few ducks in the outbreak areas really Australia and are indeed as vectors especially under suspicion), but the list of countries is not quite right: there were H5N1 outbreaks in Japan, South Korea (both January 2004) Malaysia has been revealed. really no reported cases, but that strikes me in the face of a string of outbursts on the Thai side along the Malaysian border is very reliable before.


4) poultry feed, poultry manure fertilization: where exactly are the on the situation in Europe-taken arguments when we do let the presumption in mind that the agrochemical industry has left many scandals the impression that ultimately to be able to do anything? I have serious problems with the idea that infected chicken manure from China will arrive in three weeks on German fields, without having to dry or to heat above 10 degrees (this should reduce the persistence of the virus again). The Trans-port is hardly take place by air. And the adoption of Chicken manure exports from Ukraine, Romania (both happened to importers and producers of poultry in the range of 10 - 15 million / year) or Turkey or all of these newer areas outbreak is the same for me anything but plausible. The hypothesis of the contaminated feed of poultry in central Europe I find problematic because of recent outbreaks have occurred in poultry, maybe not, but in the open and just GE-rade no outbreaks in poultry stocks went ahead. This can be explained only with the wil-conspiracy theories and confidentiality, the we realistically ren-erspa should and where we should remember that even the totalitarian states and is not sol-chen with clear censorship of the press managed to avian influenza outbreaks in the medium term remain secret.


5) from the beginning not quite serious criticism of the release of viruses from the FLI has become redundant with the outbreaks at Lake Constance I suppose (no, even at the bird observatory, we have no such virus stock, although the German first two outbreak areas within shouting distance of each ringing (Hiddensee, Radolfzell) yes now represent a remark-able coincidence and raise the question ob in Ostfriesland (IfV Wilhelmshaven) vielleicht nachlässig untersucht wird??)


Aber Spaß beiseite: ich hoffe, man nimmt es mir nicht übel, wenn ich auch die Argumente der Gegner der Vogelzug-Vektoren-Hypothese kritisch hinterfrage. Ich glaube nicht, dass viel zu ge­winnen ist, wenn auf so dünnem Eis argumentiert wird. Und dabei vermute ich viel belastbarere Punkte hier:


- die offensichtliche Zeitlücke zwischen Ankunft potenzieller Wildvogel-Virenträger und den ersten bemerkten Ausbrüchen von 12-15 Wochen. Wo ist das Virus in dieser Zeit und warum wird es nicht bemerkt?


- the beginning of endemism of H5N1 in parts of Asia (such as a virus can be endemic, which is thought at the same time that dispositions made by wild birds around half Kontintente-spread is?)


- the lack of outbreaks in high-traffic destination - and passage areas of migratory birds from highly contaminated AI areas


- first analysis of genetic relatedness of different H5N1 types, from which the propagation paths reconstructed (in SE Asia), make the wild birds spread is not very likely but significant relationships with poultry movements have.


I think it is advisable to put on these points, and which can not be excluded in principle, but the Lich possibility that wild birds can transmit the virus (!) - Just not under the current political and press like shown primitive patterns.

Regards
Wolfgang Fiedler

At each point I would add the following:

To 1) The explanations by means of migration routes from China to the indoasiatischen region to Europe (and even complaints) seem to me not plausible, especially since they took place over several Zugperioden (May) want. Where the virus is in the meantime? There is no evidence that the virus in the wild "inactive" can survive. Neither after the major outbreak in Qinghai still in Mongolia there were any subsequent infections in wild birds. There is also no evidence that the virus can survive in a wild bird population. After all the insights in the field-not get many birds in contaminated areas the virus. In the other there is the alternative that they die of it, or with the virus-who finished the. In both cases the virus disappears again quickly. A "ping-pong effect", after which the virus within der Inkubationszeit (und danach?) an andere Vögel wei­tergegeben wird und sich so über Monate unentdeckt in der Vogelpopulation hält, ist für diesen hochpathogenen Erreger nicht wahrscheinlich. Es müsste hier eine Vogelart (-population) geben, auf die das Virus nicht hochpathogen wirkt. Dazu liegen meines Wis­sens keine Erkenntnisse vor.

Und: Warum werden in Ländern wie Japan, Südkorea und Indien keine Ausbrüche (im Freiland wohlgemerkt) festgestellt, obwohl dort wesentlich mehr Vögel aus und durch die Befallsgebiete hinziehen als nach Europa? Es gab keine Krankheitsausbrüche im Frei­land irgendwo zwischen Kaspischem Meer und Japan im letzten Winterhalbjahr - Not even in India, where many birds spend the winter, pull through Qinghai and breed there. If the disease is carried by wild birds from the Asian contaminated areas, outbreaks should have been found along the migration routes for the many millions of water birds in Asia. The assumption that the virus through wild birds from China to Europe (to Germany) will be reached, seems to me, therefore, extremely unlikely.

Re 2) It is still the case that the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, the most die-wild bird on the spot. If not, there would be more radial off-breitungszonen to the outbreaks, and in the short term. VER should also be detected in several wild birds carrying the virus. Instead, the virus is clearly detected only in dead and dying animals. In Hong Kong in recent years sampled about 16,000 live wild birds - all negative. All found there with the virus infected wild birds were dead (Martin Williams via e-mail). The apparently very few observations of the highly pathogenic virus in the healthy wild birds (what were the willow sparrows?) Can actually be observed only within the incubation period. would then either be disposed of the body have the virus or die from it. In this time can Of course those of other infections in birds be flying due to the short incubation period (see below) in outbreaks of diseases. Knowledge of bird species to which the virus acts are highly pathogenic, as I said not before. If there were such a species, the virus could theoretically hold it there, without leading to outbreaks.
evidence of mallard ducks in captivity (this published case may refer the note), the virus may in (apparent) had health in the body, are not transferable to migratory birds, the very different physiological scope (see also Source1).

The cases almost simultaneous occurrence (within the last 1-2 weeks) of infected wild birds in various places in Central Europe are in fact against the theory that yielded material has led to the infection. But - as Wolf-gang Fiedler finds himself - they speak against the spread by migratory birds. An example of how little we know.

helpful little as I feel the randomness of the argument: The outbreaks in Germany came at a time of hibernation. Even Wolfgang Fiedler sees no correlation with flight paths of migratory birds. If outbreaks in March / April, at a time of intense (water) bird migration, not been the argument that the migratory birds size: th can bring the virus? And regardless of whether a disease outbreak in the area of origin was noted or not. Note: Maybe a break would be in March / April is not because the virus is the transport at higher temperatures, would not have survived (see to 4).

To 3) Here I was in my letter dated 02.27.2006, perhaps a little too tight. In Ja-pan and South Korea are no outbreaks in wild birds stocks have been found, which is more than one million in South Korea of wintering water birds really Remarkably - and removes the 500 km from southern China, where for about 10 years, there is the plague! There were outbreaks in poultry farms, with small numbers of victims in wild birds. This, however, were not migratory birds, but as crows, eating the waste. All outbreaks have been eliminated with slaughtering of poultry (see also Source1).

also said Wolfgang Fiedler example of Thailand (many outbreaks) and the neighboring country of Malaysia (no outbreaks) shows how different handling of controls and different treatment of the poultry industry, the occurrence of certain of the disease, but not the presence of migratory birds. There is no reason to believe that disease outbreaks in Malaysia would be less well known than in Thailand. In the rest of Malaysia recently had an occurrence of the disease, presumably due to inputs of fighting cocks smuggled back.

For me, this fact is the stop before the disease state borders a very important argument for GE that the transport of the trade is very likely with wild birds is that it is extremely unlikely.

On 4) I waste no detailed information on the handling of poultry manure as fertilizer and (and food). I called individual facts and suggested also seek here (instead of only the wild birds). Quelle2 liefert hierzu zahlrei­che Anregungen! China muss hier auch nicht die einzige potenzielle Quelle sein. In der Türkei existiert in Afyon eine Fabrik zur Produktion von organischem Dünger aus Hüh­nermist, die eine Kapazität von 300 to täglich hat und damit die größte in Europa ist (Quelle3). Gleichzeitig werden als Hauptimporteure des Wirtschaftsbereiches „Tier- und Meeresprodukte“ aus der Türkei die Länder Italien, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechen­land und Japan genannt. Wie lange braucht ein LKW von der Türkei nach Mitteleuropa? Jetzt in der kalten Jahreszeit ist die Fahrzeit wesentlich kürzer, als H5N1-Viren lebens­fähig sind. Ich habe no information on whether such transports take place, whether trucks are disinfected after each journey, or whether applied fertilizer, fertilizer bags are stored or the like. But these possible (likely to) vectors should not be excluded a priori. The same applies to the Le-bendgeflügel: The second-largest factory in Europe to market a fertilized egg is in Turkey. It produces over 100 million hatching eggs, of which is a significant part is exported to Eastern Europe. These eggs can transmit the avian influenza (FAO, in Quelle4).
food from poultry waste is probably for Central Europe a highly unlikely transmission route, but is seen as the Russian authorities of an outbreak in a farm in Kurgan as a possible infection route, in which 460,000 birds were killed (Quelle4). The experiences of the BSE scandal, but we should also be be suspicious.

These are only highlights in the business of the poultry industry. When the spread hypotheses are examined here seriously?

To 5) This note was not an accusation, but an anecdote from abroad.

Furthermore, I was an e-mail forwarded to the University of Greifswald (not an exact quote):

Thereafter, the incubation period of the (classical) with avian influenza 1-7 days specified ben, and the disease duration of 1-5 days. This leaves an infected bird 2-12 days (in which he can fly too), to carry the pathogen on. In excretion of duck virus at 4 ° C for 30 days were infectious, at 20 ° C for 4 days. In summer, they are rapidly inactivated by ultraviolet light. In seawater kotverschmutztem the virus at 0 ° C to 30 days are infectious at 22 ° C only 4 days.

According Wild birds are generally able to carry the virus. The question is whether this is actually real sitagliptin takes place. Relevant means, in sufficient amount to lead to further spreading the disease. And this, it is my knowledge so far no evidence-NES (see above for 1, 2 and 3). There Now, after almost 10 years Ren occurrence of highly pathogenic H5N1 strain in Asia, there is no proven case of transmission pipelines by migratory birds, which experienced a disease outbreak among wild birds, GE-added (very likely except in my letter of 02/27/2006 mentioned outbreak in Mongolia, just 100 km from the source area in Russia (not China) corresponding away).

The FLI is added by the current as at 03/03/2006 "Answers to questions about the highly pathogenic avian influenza" as a pdf file-ins has made internet, where migratory birds play a special role (Quelle5) (not an exact quote):

is then the only explanation (hypothesis) to the question of how the virus came even before the onset of bird migration to complaints made, to wild birds: This would have thrown cold spells in January, the winter run of bird populations to the west. About overlapping breeding areas birds could transport the virus from breaking off at the Qinghai Lake (May 2005) was to the north, and then here in the wintering areas, approximately have been. A concerned whooper swan was previously from Latvia. However, in the Baltic countries, no H5N1 Fund have been reported. Also, mute swans can fly for long periods of cold weather up to 500 km.

were also the first outbreaks in western Russia, Romania, the Ukraine, and Turkey, most likely attributable to the entry by migratory birds acids. Furthermore, a contact of migratory birds to infected animals in the previously affected countries in Africa and Europe was not excluded, so can not further spread of the virus by migratory birds in Europe are excluded.

Transport over long distances (Affected areas up to us) is referred to as rather unlikely, since wild birds usually die after infection. However, it is conceivable that the pathogen spreads gradually (by overlapping breeding areas and migration routes). According to recent studies, water birds and spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 Wiren, even without the disease. This could Vi acids are isolated from mobile, apparently healthy migratory birds.

These explanations seem to me very far-fetched. The idea that the virus has been transported from China in April / May 2005 in the breeding grounds in the Arctic tundra, then from there on whooper swans the Baltic states in January 2006 after complaints about (after 8-9 Mon-ordinates!) to lead to an outbreak sounds to me very, very unlikely. Also, alternatively referred to mute swans appear as a vector for the outbreak on Ruegen implausible. I am not aware that mute swans from South East Europe at low temperatures to avoid north-northwest. Even swans from Ukraine (as is the virus get there?) Would avoid the extreme case, probably not 1000 km to the northwest, but rather the wintermilderen Black Sea areas, or even go to the Mediterranean region.

The fact that the first outbreaks in western Russia, Romania, Ukraine und der Türkei höchstwahrscheinlich auf den Eintrag durch Zugvögel zurückzuführen sind, ist eine weitere Spekulation, für die keinerlei untermauernde Fakten genannt werden. Viel wahrscheinlicher dürfte der Handel mit Geflügel und Geflügelprodukten sein. Wir haben auf den vermeintlichen Zugwegen von Asien nach Westrussland und in die Türkei keinerlei Ausbrüche in der Natur, die aber zu erwarten wären. Wir haben aber einen lebhaften Handel, zahlreiche Straßenverbindun­gen, und in den Massentierhaltungen der Türkei (mit internem Handel mit Geflügel und Geflü­gelprodukten) günstige Voraussetzungen, um eingeschleppten Viren zu Ausbrüchen zu verhel­fen. The internet can be found on this additional information, for reasons of space I would not get back (Quelle6). Wolfgang Fiedler mentioned above under 4) Romania and Ukraine as importers of poultry per 10-15 million / year. But this would be an explanation for the spread of the disease in Southeast and Eastern Europe. After all, notes

the FLI that a direct long-distance transport of the pathogen is unlikely. Instead, it is considered possible that the pathogen spreads gradually. That this not established, nor after the onset of Asia in recent years is only likely to be concealed. There is no evidence that the highly pathogenic H5N1 can survive in wild populations of wild birds. With the birds died of the disease. Ultimately, the experience with this disease, which could be collected in abundance in Asia, are not noted. trigger to us by train-birds is both highly unlikely, on the other hand, well suited, white-more panic over migratory birds: The

of FLI-mentioned compound of Africa (poultry farm in Nigeria there). It does not take much imagination to accept that now all the other outbreaks in Europe on the transfer by train coming from Africa-can be pushed birds.

mentioned the FLI Recent studies that water birds the highly pathogenic to Vi-rus spread without the disease. Also said to have been isolated according to the latest research from highly pathogenic H5N1 mobile, apparently healthy migratory birds. These studies should be named because they are contrary to previous experiences.

What is worrying me continue with the representations of the FLI, the approach is to designate only to migratory birds as a possible transmission to us. No word on the trade of poultry, no word on the trade in poultry products. The poultry industry is huge and diverse-IST. Many Transmission routes are possible, of eggs and chicks of empty transport boxes up to fertilizers from sewage. None of them is named. Instead, wild birds continue to appear publicly as possible or probable vectors. That this leads to completely excessive measures, I have the letter dated 27.02.2006 has already been indicated. Mid-lerweile will not only house martins, but already stork nests are removed, and is in a state of serious discussion to shoot striking birds as a precaution.
prevents also the focus on migratory birds may be because alternative explanations to be thoroughly examined. However, möchte ich nicht ausschließen (und hoffe es inständig), dass dies im Hintergrund erfolgt.

Zusammenfassend möchte ich feststellen, dass die (Fern-)Verbreitung der hochpathogenen Variante des H5N1-Virus durch Zugvögel sehr unwahrscheinlich ist. Nach dem bisherigen Wis­sen stirbt die Seuche im Freiland mit den Vögeln. Für ein Überdauern im Freiland ohne Aus­bruch der Seuche gibt es momentan keinerlei Anhaltspunkte (theoretisch denkbar vielleicht in überfrierenden Gewässern – oder in noch nicht bekannten Vogelarten, auf die das Virus nicht hochpathogen wirkt). So gibt es immer noch keinen seriösen Erklärungsansatz für das Auftreten in Deutschland. Aber gerade weil wir hier vor mehr Fragen als Antworten stehen, sollten wir nicht so hartnäckig ignorieren, was in Asien in den letzten knapp 10 Jahren an Erfahrungen gesammelt wurde. Erst wenn bei uns auch Zugvögel als mutmaßliche Hauptvektoren in den Hintergrund treten, werden wir die Hauptausbreitungswege erforschen, vielleicht auch erkennen und eindämmen können.

Klemens Steiof

Quelle1: www.birdskorea.org/poultryflu_mainpage.asp

Quelle2: http://www.drmartinwilliams.com/component/option,com_simpleboard/Itemid,137/func,showcat/catid,7/&Itemid=155

Source3: www.turkishtime.org/33/en_39.asp

Quelle4: http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=194

Quelle5: http://www .fli.bund.de / files / user_upload / documents / News / av_Influ / FAQ_Av_Influenza.pdf

Quelle6: http://www.drmartinwilliams.com/component/option, com_simpleboard / Itemid, 155/func, view / id, 443/catid, 7 /

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