The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank he founded .
Thursday, October 12, 2006
Congratulatory Speechto Women
Nobel Peace Prize 2006
The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank he founded .
The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank he founded .
Saturday, September 30, 2006
Electrick Box Level 19
Solbach-Freise Prize for Prof. Dr. Siegwart-Horst Günther
for his efforts in publicizing der Folgen von Munition aus abgereichertem Uran (depleted uranium, DU) im Irak und auf dem Balkan.
>> www.stiftung-zivilcourage.de 
for his efforts in publicizing der Folgen von Munition aus abgereichertem Uran (depleted uranium, DU) im Irak und auf dem Balkan.
>> www.stiftung-zivilcourage.de
Tuesday, May 2, 2006
Weekly Avg. Yield--u.s. Treasury
Dear reader
since the occurrence of avian influenza (highly pathogenic avian influenza, HPAI) in Germany there is a general uncertainty over wild birds. Migratory birds spreading avian flu? This question is crucial.
have given it two positions:
- Had wild birds (or birds) no reservoir, then that would mean that the occurrence in the open (eg on Ruegen and in southern Germany) from Anthropogenic discharges precede the virus from the field of poultry must. Because there is HPAI "at home". It would, however, that the measures may be limited against the possible entry by wild birds (such as stabling and poultry) on a shorter period. Because in the wild the virus is not very long survive. Since the incubation period is only a few days, an infected bird dies quickly or sufficiently developed antibodies and is healthy again. In both cases the virus disappears from the wild bird population.
- were wild birds, however still a reservoir for HPAI, then could the avian flu again and again in Field occur and we would actually have to think long-term strategies against possible entries by wild birds in the field of poultry husbandry. This would leave us to avian influenza in Central Europe may be obtained even for years.
In January / February 2006 I visited on an ornithological tour South Korea and Hong Kong. In East Asia, the currently circulating avian influenza outbreaks of the H5N1 virus responsible for 10 years. Relevant experience with the disease are present there. I won after discussions with local ornithologists believe that it is extremely unlikely that wild birds can be a reservoir for avian influenza. Back in Germany I was confronted with the opposite view, which is also the competent authorities Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut regimes. The policy is largely in accordance with, and even after the outbreak in poultry farm in Saxony, Mr Seehofer out as the cause of wild birds.
I was involved with three letters spread over the Internet in the discussion. In this letter, I'm on the low probability of transmission by wild birds noted and possible alternatives. On multiple request, I have attached to this page. These letters contain a wealth of information and ideas zum Thema, auch Hinweise auf Literatur und andere Internetseiten. Ich habe die Schreiben der Authentizität willen unverändert gelassen.
Zusammengefasst sind es folgende Gründe, die eine Beteiligung von Zugvögeln an der Ausbreitung von HPAI so unwahrscheinlich werden lassen:
1. Die sprunghafte Ausbreitung innerhalb Asiens nach Westen und von Asien nach Europa folgt den Handelswegen und nicht irgendwelchen Vogelzuglinien, zumal viele Sprünge außerhalb der Vogelzugzeiten (und von Geflügelhaltung zu Geflügelhaltung) stattgefunden haben. Auch nach Deutschland gibt es keine Korrelationen zum Vogelzug. Gegenteilige Interpretationen von WHO und FLI sind reine Spekulationen, die nicht durch ornithologische Befunde gedeckt sind.
2. Die meisten sterbenden Vögel verenden an Ort und Stelle (der mutmaßlichen Infektion) bzw. fliegen noch maximal ein paar 100 km. Nicht erkrankende, aber infizierte Vögel, können das Virus für ein paar Tage ausscheiden. Dann müsste aber bald eine Neuinfektion erfolgen, wenn die Seuche wieder ausbrechen sollte. Dies ist im Freiland nicht oder kaum erfolgt. Vielmehr verschwindet die Seuche im Freiland recht schnell wieder.
3. In the outbreaks in the wild, there is no spread of the disease subjects. This would be expected, however, when migratory birds carry the virus.
4th So far no known migratory species, which can carry the virus without illness for an extended period of time. Either died of the bird or he lives, in both cases, the virus disappeared after a few days.
5th The virus can remain within the field outside the host is not very long (at higher temperatures only a few days in cold weather a few weeks).
6th Globally, almost no healthy birds with HPAI is found (with currently more than 100,000 sampled wild birds only 6 ducks at Poyang Lake in southeast China, is assumed to have, that they had been infected shortly before).
7th In countries with millions of immigrant birds from Asia last winter, virtually no outbreaks have been recorded in the field. However, when migratory birds an der Westausbreitung (quer zu ihrer Hauptzugrichtung) beteiligt sein sollten, hätte es zu Hunderten von Seuchenausbrüchen in den asiatischen Überwinterungsgebieten kommen müssen - da, wo sie tatsächlich hinziehen.
8. Die Geflügelpest macht vor Ländergrenzen halt (z.B. Japan, Süd-Korea, Malaysia, Phillippinen, Australien). Ausschlaggebend sind somit Einfuhrkontrollen und der Umgang mit den Geflügelhaltungen in den einzelnen Staaten, nicht aber Zugvögel, die Staatsgrenzen normalerweise ignorieren.
9. Wild birds are subject to natural selection so that HPAI affected individuals have no greater chance of survival.
A summary of the topic to the "Reviews of Birds" (published by the German Council for the Protection of Birds) is in preparation.
Briefly about myself: I am landscape designers, working in a nature protection authority in the area of species protection and live in Potsdam. For 30 years I have watched birds and am working hard and international issues of bird migration and bird conservation.
Clement Steiof
PS:
Männle Lord gave me some updated and current links sent to you. These are reproduced below (as of 14/05/2006):
Chen, H. et al. (2006): Establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 influenza virus in Asia: Implications for pandemic control. - PNAS 103 (8): 2845-2850.
http://flu.org.cn/upfile/attachment/0511120103v2.pdf
Gilbert, M. (2006): Free-grazing Ducks and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Thailand
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no02/05-0640.htm
Hulse-Post, DJ (2005): Role of domestic ducks in the propagation and biological evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses in Asia
http://www.flu.org.cn/upfile/attachment/0504662102v1.pdf
addition, two online abstracts to:
Kou, Z. et al. (2005): New Genotype of Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses Isolated from Tree Sparrows in China
http://jvi.asm.org/cgi/content/abstract/79/24/15460
Sturm-Ramirez, KM (2005): Are Ducks Contributing to the Endemicity of Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Influenza Virus in Asia
http://jvi.asm.org/cgi/content/abstract/79/17/11269
Finally some translations:
Grain Briefing (February 2006): Fowl play: The Poultry Industry's central role in the bird flu crisis. -
http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=194
Männle, D. et al. (March 2006): Fowl play - Framed - The central Role of the poultry industry in the bird flu crisis. http://buendnis-gegen-keulung.de/InfobriefGRAIN.pdf
Feare, CJ (2006): Fish farming and the risk of spread of avian influenza.
www.birdlife.org / action / science / species / avian_flu / index.html
Männle, D. (2006): fish farms and the risk of spreading avian influenza. http://www.nabu.de/imperia/md/content/nabude/vogelschutz/vogelgrippe/10.pdf
addition:
Grain - Against the Grain (April 2006): The top-down global response to bird flu.
http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=12
Männle D. (April 2006): The global response of the authorities on bird flu.
http://buendnis-gegen-keulung.de/ AgainstTheGrain.pdf
Friday, April 7, 2006
Where Can I Get A Jirachi
letter dated 27.2.2006 6.3.2006
for causes to the spread of avian influenza in Germany in get a dead end. As a possible vector currently train and other game birds are placed in the foreground. For this mode of transmission worldwide but there is as yet no evidence of local spread (several kilometers) apart. Main mode of transmission the last few months is expected in addition to the global poultry trade in the use of poultry manure as fertilizer in fish farms and may also be in agriculture. Another role may play slaughterhouse wastes and other waste products of the mass poultry. It is clear that in Germany, currently in ignorance of some wrong action is taken.
like this I explain below:
I am a week ago returned from East Asia, where I could learn extensively by the local ornithologist on the occurrence of avian influenza (collectively referred to as sources1 +2, extensive details in Source3). There were individual Cases of the occurrence in recent months and years analyzed, with the result that wild birds as vectors over large distances are extremely unlikely. Migration routes and flight routes of wild birds do not correlate with the propagation paths of the disease. Neither in Asia nor from Asia to Europe, there are migration routes between the affected areas. Only one case of possible transport of virus by wild birds from China to the South Mongolia (some 100 km) is mentioned by the Asian bird watchers. There was an outbreak on a local basis, and the field disappeared within weeks - in line with other "normal" pathological in wild animal populations with natural selection. There was no transmission to poultry.
Wild birds are not vectors, but on the other hand the victims of human action, as demonstrated by the sometimes spectacular eruptions (eg, the death of thousands of bar-headed geese in a short time in Qinghai, China in May 2005). It is also not likely that an infected bird can still fly long distances, most birds die on the spot. It is noticeable also that occurs in countries with strict import controls, even though no avian 100.000de of migratory birds from infected areas also move there, such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Australia. In South Korea alone has over a million wintering waterfowl from China and Siberia.
The course of the disease spreading in recent months, however, can be well explained with the two presumed main transmission routes: first, the trade in poultry and wild birds. It is to think of people who carry the virus (eg clothing or equipment) from one posture to another animal. Still finds illegal trade instead of chickens from China (apprehended in Italy in October 2005 and in the UK, the outbreak in Nigeria). Also traded with wild birds, the virus reached Europe. On the other hand, it is the trade in poultry products. This includes especially poultry manure as fertilizer in the fishing industry, but also in agriculture. As fertilizer and waste from slaughter houses are used. Worse, According to current information (see Source3) are slaughterhouse waste and other organic waste from the mass poultry (including corpses) to processed animal feed - again for poultry. Apparently, the poultry industry disposed of their waste by selling it. Parallels with the BSE scandal are striking. The virus is weeks in manure and other organic material to survive (FAO statement, and references. Quelle3a after, under favorable conditions, 30-35 days).
It has already been known that the giant factory farms in China solved its feces disposal problem in that they sell the manure as fertilizer. The FAO has this massive support and encouraging the use in fish ponds to increase yields. This is the distribution channel, the last few months is probably the majority of new Pestausbrüche due. The aforementioned mass death of bar-headed geese in Qinghai is preceded that have been created with the support of FAO fish ponds that were fertilized with poultry intensively. As mentioned countries have been spared with strict controls on imports of avian influenza. Countries mit schlechten Einfuhrkontrollen sind jedoch von vielen Krankheitsausbrüchen betroffen. Handel mit Geflügelkot findet auch aus Asien heraus und offensichtlich bis nach Europa hinein statt. So findet sich im Internet die (von mir nicht überprüfte) Aussage über intensive Importe von Dünger aus Geflügelprodukten aus China zur Verwendung in Fischteichen in Serbien (Quellen3a+3b). Nebenbei bemerkt gibt es auch in der Türkei industrielle Hühnerhaltung, die ihre Abfälle als Dünger entsorgt.
Ausführliche Informationen zur Verwendung von Vogelkot in Fischteichen siehe unter Quelle3b.
Mit diesem Wissen aus Asien zurückgekommen, fällt mir die in Deutschland erzeugte öffentliche Panik Wild birds, especially in front. Even official I am confronted hereby. The first applications for the removal of house martin nests were found, a project to accommodate injured wild birds has been closed by the vets, and callers ask about the dangers of staying outside. It currently goes by without television evening, set in the not so-called "bird flu experts," the spread of the disease by migrating birds in the foreground, and also Minister Seehofer has, in the grim television on the coming migratory birds there (in "Christiansen", 2/26/2006) .
It is amazing that even the science in Germany "competent" Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut Wildvögel für einen möglichen Überträger hält (Pressemitteilung vom 20.1.2006). Es wird aber nirgendwo darüber Auskunft gegeben, welche Vögel denn den Erregern von A nach B transportiert haben können. Weder für Rügen noch für den Bodensee liegen hierzu Aussagen vor.
Da ist zu fragen, was in Deutschland denn für die Krankheitsausbrüche verantwortlich ist. In Hongkong witzelt man über den Zufall, dass der räumlich völlig isolierte Ausbruch auf Rügen nur wenige Kilometer neben den Laboren des Friedlich-Löffler-Institut stattgefunden hat (Quelle3a). Wurde dort mit dem Erreger gearbeitet und haben sich alle mit dem Erreger umgehenden Mitarbeiter ausreichend dekontaminiert, before they leave the institution grounds? For much more likely but I think the way of fertilizer. Then point out the chiefly affected water birds. I have not read anywhere or heard, that control of the applied fertilizer were made, and this infection can be ruled out. This has to be gefahndet intense, because if businesses are to make false declarations are also not ruled out (see "rotten meat" and BSE scandal, illegal trade in protected animal and plant species).
find noteworthy, I also found that mute swans are very frequent victims named among the wild birds, including in previous outbreaks in East and Southern Europe. These are certainly striking, and are therefore easier to find than other birds. Seems likely, however, that they are at risk of particular ecological food. In fish ponds, swans come because of her long neck and easier accessibility of the sediment may be more intense with the introduced pathogens in contact as other water birds. In addition, mute swans are also looking to food fields (stubble, canola fields, etc.), where they also may be exposed to the pathogen (introduced by fertilizers).
are the way, poultry husbandry victims of avian influenza and thus the poultry industry: Direct (potentially) by the trade in contaminated pet food, and indirectly by the official action against the alleged spread of the disease by wild birds (Einstallungsflicht).
I would therefore urge that - not to promote fairy tales of the wild birds as vectors for avian influenza on - admittedly very comfortable. It leads to panic behavior in the population, mainly because it prevents to find the actual cause and to prevent the further spread of the disease. Inevitably, many "protective measures" into space, instead, be the wrong betroffen (Naturbesucher, Kleintierhalter).
Hingegen sollte bei jedem neuen Ausbruch der Seuche bei Wildvögeln die Frage im Mittelpunkt stehen, wie das Virus in die Landschaft (und damit die Nahrungskette) eingebracht wurde. Welche Geflügelprodukte sind verwendet worden? Wo stammen diese her? Ist irgendwo Geflügelkot aus Befallsgebieten untergemischt worden? Sind alle Düngerlieferungen richtig deklariert worden? Im Grunde genommen könnte bei jedem neuen Ausbruch in Deutschland sofort eine Strafanzeige gegen Unbekannt gestellt werden.
Quelle1: www.birdskorea.org/poultryflu_mainpage.asp
Quelle2: www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/index.html
Source3: www.drmartinwilliams.com / forum
Quelle3a: www.drmartinwilliams.com / component / option, com_simpleborard / Itemid, 155/func, view / id, 271 / ...
Quelle3b: www.drmartinwilliams.com / component / option, com_simpleboard / Itemid, 155/func, view / id, 209 / ...
Will Alcohol Stop The Spread Of Herpes
Today I received to my letter of 27./28.2.2006 lot of feedback. These range from approval to "relatively nonsense." In addition, I have received many ideas and suggestions from Nial Moores (South Korea) and Dr. Martin Williams (Hong Kong), after which a more nuanced Picture can be drawn.
My reply must therefore unfortunately be a little more detail.
the critical opinions is that of Wolfgang Fiedler of the Ornithological Radolf-cell on the rest. I would therefore like to reproduce below, also the discus-sion as transparent as possible to continue (quote):
Moreover, I can but in the current outbreak patterns quite
About once immune-related gene with the migration event. Although nowhere in
all cases, but it's not to be expected that the virus only
used one or the other vehicle. I look at the Steiof (BirdLife, LBV-...)
arguments, some problems: 1) "within .. neither Asia nor from Asia to Europe, there are migration routes between-affected areas." This is incorrect. The trail follows the virus from the Chinese coast in the fall bird migration Indoasiatischen room. About one intermediate stage in the South Asian region (Herbstzg - winter - spring migration) can be explained by the westward movement. And the spatial and even temporal coincidence (including compliance with the Vi-rentyp) on the stage of South-West Siberia to the Black Sea region can not be over-Hen. No doubt there are also a number not so explainable way of the virus, but it would be incorrect to say that there is absolutely no match. I am due to the-time outbreak pattern convinced that we must all say goodbye to the assumption that the arrival of the virus in the field (carried by a wild bird) at a particular point is inevitable and timely conduct there rules to be perceptible mass mortality of wild birds must. Thus, many outbreaks have on the temporal axis simply did not explain. That means, however, that the westward migration of several Zugpe RIOD away entirely conceivable is not that at each node of the imaginary mass extinction cascade must immediately be registered. Who are the images of heavily made present to the north on range-breeding season-ring records of ringed ducks in winter quarters, understands what I mean by the potential for East-West migration. Wolfgang Fiedler
At each point I would add the following:
To 1) The explanations by means of migration routes from China to the indoasiatischen region to Europe (and even complaints) seem to me not plausible, especially since they took place over several Zugperioden (May) want. Where the virus is in the meantime? There is no evidence that the virus in the wild "inactive" can survive. Neither after the major outbreak in Qinghai still in Mongolia there were any subsequent infections in wild birds. There is also no evidence that the virus can survive in a wild bird population. After all the insights in the field-not get many birds in contaminated areas the virus. In the other there is the alternative that they die of it, or with the virus-who finished the. In both cases the virus disappears again quickly. A "ping-pong effect", after which the virus within der Inkubationszeit (und danach?) an andere Vögel wei­tergegeben wird und sich so über Monate unentdeckt in der Vogelpopulation hält, ist für diesen hochpathogenen Erreger nicht wahrscheinlich. Es müsste hier eine Vogelart (-population) geben, auf die das Virus nicht hochpathogen wirkt. Dazu liegen meines Wis­sens keine Erkenntnisse vor.
Und: Warum werden in Ländern wie Japan, Südkorea und Indien keine Ausbrüche (im Freiland wohlgemerkt) festgestellt, obwohl dort wesentlich mehr Vögel aus und durch die Befallsgebiete hinziehen als nach Europa? Es gab keine Krankheitsausbrüche im Frei­land irgendwo zwischen Kaspischem Meer und Japan im letzten Winterhalbjahr - Not even in India, where many birds spend the winter, pull through Qinghai and breed there. If the disease is carried by wild birds from the Asian contaminated areas, outbreaks should have been found along the migration routes for the many millions of water birds in Asia. The assumption that the virus through wild birds from China to Europe (to Germany) will be reached, seems to me, therefore, extremely unlikely.
Re 2) It is still the case that the highly pathogenic H5N1 virus, the most die-wild bird on the spot. If not, there would be more radial off-breitungszonen to the outbreaks, and in the short term. VER should also be detected in several wild birds carrying the virus. Instead, the virus is clearly detected only in dead and dying animals. In Hong Kong in recent years sampled about 16,000 live wild birds - all negative. All found there with the virus infected wild birds were dead (Martin Williams via e-mail). The apparently very few observations of the highly pathogenic virus in the healthy wild birds (what were the willow sparrows?) Can actually be observed only within the incubation period. would then either be disposed of the body have the virus or die from it. In this time can Of course those of other infections in birds be flying due to the short incubation period (see below) in outbreaks of diseases. Knowledge of bird species to which the virus acts are highly pathogenic, as I said not before. If there were such a species, the virus could theoretically hold it there, without leading to outbreaks.
evidence of mallard ducks in captivity (this published case may refer the note), the virus may in (apparent) had health in the body, are not transferable to migratory birds, the very different physiological scope (see also Source1).
The cases almost simultaneous occurrence (within the last 1-2 weeks) of infected wild birds in various places in Central Europe are in fact against the theory that yielded material has led to the infection. But - as Wolf-gang Fiedler finds himself - they speak against the spread by migratory birds. An example of how little we know.
helpful little as I feel the randomness of the argument: The outbreaks in Germany came at a time of hibernation. Even Wolfgang Fiedler sees no correlation with flight paths of migratory birds. If outbreaks in March / April, at a time of intense (water) bird migration, not been the argument that the migratory birds size: th can bring the virus? And regardless of whether a disease outbreak in the area of origin was noted or not. Note: Maybe a break would be in March / April is not because the virus is the transport at higher temperatures, would not have survived (see to 4).
To 3) Here I was in my letter dated 02.27.2006, perhaps a little too tight. In Ja-pan and South Korea are no outbreaks in wild birds stocks have been found, which is more than one million in South Korea of wintering water birds really Remarkably - and removes the 500 km from southern China, where for about 10 years, there is the plague! There were outbreaks in poultry farms, with small numbers of victims in wild birds. This, however, were not migratory birds, but as crows, eating the waste. All outbreaks have been eliminated with slaughtering of poultry (see also Source1).
also said Wolfgang Fiedler example of Thailand (many outbreaks) and the neighboring country of Malaysia (no outbreaks) shows how different handling of controls and different treatment of the poultry industry, the occurrence of certain of the disease, but not the presence of migratory birds. There is no reason to believe that disease outbreaks in Malaysia would be less well known than in Thailand. In the rest of Malaysia recently had an occurrence of the disease, presumably due to inputs of fighting cocks smuggled back.
For me, this fact is the stop before the disease state borders a very important argument for GE that the transport of the trade is very likely with wild birds is that it is extremely unlikely.
On 4) I waste no detailed information on the handling of poultry manure as fertilizer and (and food). I called individual facts and suggested also seek here (instead of only the wild birds). Quelle2 liefert hierzu zahlrei­che Anregungen! China muss hier auch nicht die einzige potenzielle Quelle sein. In der Türkei existiert in Afyon eine Fabrik zur Produktion von organischem Dünger aus Hüh­nermist, die eine Kapazität von 300 to täglich hat und damit die größte in Europa ist (Quelle3). Gleichzeitig werden als Hauptimporteure des Wirtschaftsbereiches „Tier- und Meeresprodukte“ aus der Türkei die Länder Italien, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechen­land und Japan genannt. Wie lange braucht ein LKW von der Türkei nach Mitteleuropa? Jetzt in der kalten Jahreszeit ist die Fahrzeit wesentlich kürzer, als H5N1-Viren lebens­fähig sind. Ich habe no information on whether such transports take place, whether trucks are disinfected after each journey, or whether applied fertilizer, fertilizer bags are stored or the like. But these possible (likely to) vectors should not be excluded a priori. The same applies to the Le-bendgeflügel: The second-largest factory in Europe to market a fertilized egg is in Turkey. It produces over 100 million hatching eggs, of which is a significant part is exported to Eastern Europe. These eggs can transmit the avian influenza (FAO, in Quelle4).
food from poultry waste is probably for Central Europe a highly unlikely transmission route, but is seen as the Russian authorities of an outbreak in a farm in Kurgan as a possible infection route, in which 460,000 birds were killed (Quelle4). The experiences of the BSE scandal, but we should also be be suspicious.
These are only highlights in the business of the poultry industry. When the spread hypotheses are examined here seriously?
To 5) This note was not an accusation, but an anecdote from abroad.
Furthermore, I was an e-mail forwarded to the University of Greifswald (not an exact quote):
Thereafter, the incubation period of the (classical) with avian influenza 1-7 days specified ben, and the disease duration of 1-5 days. This leaves an infected bird 2-12 days (in which he can fly too), to carry the pathogen on. In excretion of duck virus at 4 ° C for 30 days were infectious, at 20 ° C for 4 days. In summer, they are rapidly inactivated by ultraviolet light. In seawater kotverschmutztem the virus at 0 ° C to 30 days are infectious at 22 ° C only 4 days.
According Wild birds are generally able to carry the virus. The question is whether this is actually real sitagliptin takes place. Relevant means, in sufficient amount to lead to further spreading the disease. And this, it is my knowledge so far no evidence-NES (see above for 1, 2 and 3). There Now, after almost 10 years Ren occurrence of highly pathogenic H5N1 strain in Asia, there is no proven case of transmission pipelines by migratory birds, which experienced a disease outbreak among wild birds, GE-added (very likely except in my letter of 02/27/2006 mentioned outbreak in Mongolia, just 100 km from the source area in Russia (not China) corresponding away).
The FLI is added by the current as at 03/03/2006 "Answers to questions about the highly pathogenic avian influenza" as a pdf file-ins has made internet, where migratory birds play a special role (Quelle5) (not an exact quote):
is then the only explanation (hypothesis) to the question of how the virus came even before the onset of bird migration to complaints made, to wild birds: This would have thrown cold spells in January, the winter run of bird populations to the west. About overlapping breeding areas birds could transport the virus from breaking off at the Qinghai Lake (May 2005) was to the north, and then here in the wintering areas, approximately have been. A concerned whooper swan was previously from Latvia. However, in the Baltic countries, no H5N1 Fund have been reported. Also, mute swans can fly for long periods of cold weather up to 500 km.
were also the first outbreaks in western Russia, Romania, the Ukraine, and Turkey, most likely attributable to the entry by migratory birds acids. Furthermore, a contact of migratory birds to infected animals in the previously affected countries in Africa and Europe was not excluded, so can not further spread of the virus by migratory birds in Europe are excluded.
Transport over long distances (Affected areas up to us) is referred to as rather unlikely, since wild birds usually die after infection. However, it is conceivable that the pathogen spreads gradually (by overlapping breeding areas and migration routes). According to recent studies, water birds and spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 Wiren, even without the disease. This could Vi acids are isolated from mobile, apparently healthy migratory birds.
These explanations seem to me very far-fetched. The idea that the virus has been transported from China in April / May 2005 in the breeding grounds in the Arctic tundra, then from there on whooper swans the Baltic states in January 2006 after complaints about (after 8-9 Mon-ordinates!) to lead to an outbreak sounds to me very, very unlikely. Also, alternatively referred to mute swans appear as a vector for the outbreak on Ruegen implausible. I am not aware that mute swans from South East Europe at low temperatures to avoid north-northwest. Even swans from Ukraine (as is the virus get there?) Would avoid the extreme case, probably not 1000 km to the northwest, but rather the wintermilderen Black Sea areas, or even go to the Mediterranean region.
The fact that the first outbreaks in western Russia, Romania, Ukraine und der Türkei höchstwahrscheinlich auf den Eintrag durch Zugvögel zurückzuführen sind, ist eine weitere Spekulation, für die keinerlei untermauernde Fakten genannt werden. Viel wahrscheinlicher dürfte der Handel mit Geflügel und Geflügelprodukten sein. Wir haben auf den vermeintlichen Zugwegen von Asien nach Westrussland und in die Türkei keinerlei Ausbrüche in der Natur, die aber zu erwarten wären. Wir haben aber einen lebhaften Handel, zahlreiche Straßenverbindun­gen, und in den Massentierhaltungen der Türkei (mit internem Handel mit Geflügel und Geflü­gelprodukten) günstige Voraussetzungen, um eingeschleppten Viren zu Ausbrüchen zu verhel­fen. The internet can be found on this additional information, for reasons of space I would not get back (Quelle6). Wolfgang Fiedler mentioned above under 4) Romania and Ukraine as importers of poultry per 10-15 million / year. But this would be an explanation for the spread of the disease in Southeast and Eastern Europe. After all, notes
the FLI that a direct long-distance transport of the pathogen is unlikely. Instead, it is considered possible that the pathogen spreads gradually. That this not established, nor after the onset of Asia in recent years is only likely to be concealed. There is no evidence that the highly pathogenic H5N1 can survive in wild populations of wild birds. With the birds died of the disease. Ultimately, the experience with this disease, which could be collected in abundance in Asia, are not noted. trigger to us by train-birds is both highly unlikely, on the other hand, well suited, white-more panic over migratory birds: The
of FLI-mentioned compound of Africa (poultry farm in Nigeria there). It does not take much imagination to accept that now all the other outbreaks in Europe on the transfer by train coming from Africa-can be pushed birds.
mentioned the FLI Recent studies that water birds the highly pathogenic to Vi-rus spread without the disease. Also said to have been isolated according to the latest research from highly pathogenic H5N1 mobile, apparently healthy migratory birds. These studies should be named because they are contrary to previous experiences.
What is worrying me continue with the representations of the FLI, the approach is to designate only to migratory birds as a possible transmission to us. No word on the trade of poultry, no word on the trade in poultry products. The poultry industry is huge and diverse-IST. Many Transmission routes are possible, of eggs and chicks of empty transport boxes up to fertilizers from sewage. None of them is named. Instead, wild birds continue to appear publicly as possible or probable vectors. That this leads to completely excessive measures, I have the letter dated 27.02.2006 has already been indicated. Mid-lerweile will not only house martins, but already stork nests are removed, and is in a state of serious discussion to shoot striking birds as a precaution.
prevents also the focus on migratory birds may be because alternative explanations to be thoroughly examined. However, möchte ich nicht ausschließen (und hoffe es inständig), dass dies im Hintergrund erfolgt.
Zusammenfassend möchte ich feststellen, dass die (Fern-)Verbreitung der hochpathogenen Variante des H5N1-Virus durch Zugvögel sehr unwahrscheinlich ist. Nach dem bisherigen Wis­sen stirbt die Seuche im Freiland mit den Vögeln. Für ein Überdauern im Freiland ohne Aus­bruch der Seuche gibt es momentan keinerlei Anhaltspunkte (theoretisch denkbar vielleicht in überfrierenden Gewässern – oder in noch nicht bekannten Vogelarten, auf die das Virus nicht hochpathogen wirkt). So gibt es immer noch keinen seriösen Erklärungsansatz für das Auftreten in Deutschland. Aber gerade weil wir hier vor mehr Fragen als Antworten stehen, sollten wir nicht so hartnäckig ignorieren, was in Asien in den letzten knapp 10 Jahren an Erfahrungen gesammelt wurde. Erst wenn bei uns auch Zugvögel als mutmaßliche Hauptvektoren in den Hintergrund treten, werden wir die Hauptausbreitungswege erforschen, vielleicht auch erkennen und eindämmen können.
Klemens Steiof
Quelle1: www.birdskorea.org/poultryflu_mainpage.asp
Source3: www.turkishtime.org/33/en_39.asp
Quelle4: http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=194
Quelle5: http://www .fli.bund.de / files / user_upload / documents / News / av_Influ / FAQ_Av_Influenza.pdf
Wella Color Charm Chart
letter writing, 15.3.2006
The Radolfzell bird now appears with a table or Tufted the possible long-distance carriers of avian influenza found in the wild to have (The Independent from 03/09/2006). Mind you, the bird, to which the Asian-variant of the H5N1 virus does not highly pathogenic, and therefore can go undetected over long distances and long periods of transport (without disease outbreaks on the road).
The only study on birds in the field, which can be used for this purpose as a support, and to which the mentioned in Spiegel online "Science" message refers is that of Chen et al. (2006). It is worthwhile to consider such publication in more detail (Inhaltswie reproduction-framed):
13 115 faecal samples of migratory birds (including ducks 4674) were zwischen 2002 und 2005 in Hongkong (n=6.005) und Poyang (n=5.358) gesammelt. Dabei wurden insge­samt 44 Influenza-A-Viren sechs verschiedener Subtypen gefunden (0,34 %), nur 6 Pro­ben hiervon der hoch pathogenenen „Asia-Variante“. Letztere wurden nur in Poyang festgestellt.
Die 6 Proben mit HPAI (hoch pathogener Vogelgrippe) wurden am Poyang-See (Südost-China) bei 2 Probenahmen im Januar und März 2005 von gesund erscheinenden Enten kurz vor ihrem Abzug („apparently healthy migratory ducks … just before their migration north“) isoliert. Dies stellt 0,1 % der dort beprobten Vögel dar.
Das Überleben dieser Vögel wird damit erklärt, that they might have been infected with a harmless H5 virus, antibodies formed against this, and were therefore may be better protected against the highly pathogenic variant.
The birds of Poyang may have been infected by domestic birds in the wintering areas in southern China.
were found in Poyang two different genotypes of the virus ("Z" and "V").
Most of experimentally contaminated with these viruses (laboratory) duck survival data (goose) died and shed virus for up to 7 days also. From this, GE concludes, that the possibility that migrating ducks the virus accommo gene and can spread far.
- In Poyang were found in the 6 birds in the open 2 different genotypes of the H5N1. If the virus within the bird population (which Entenart was infected, or were there several?) To be given, would be of an identical type of virus in each bird individual be assumed. This fact has rather a short pre-infection was carried out by her discharged from various sources viruses. After Johan Mooij (via e-mail) is in the dry season, dry out Poyang Lake is an important rice growing area in which lie several poultry farms where H5N1 outbreaks at the time were recorded.
- In 6005 samples in Hong Kong was not one found with the highly pathogenic organisms, although there migratory birds spend the winter, attracting the various affected areas in East Asia. This shows that no significant vector may exist in the migratory birds. Together with the isolated in Poyang samples were less than 0.05% of the birds, carriers of HPAI. And they were probably infected shortly before.
The similarity of gene segments in January and March in Poyang and has found the disease outbreak in Qinghai (north-central China, May 2005) isolated virus clearly indicates that the ducks das Virus über große Distanzen trans­portieren können (ca. 1.700 km).
- Die Zugvogelbewegungen in China spielen sich überwiegend in Nord-Süd-Richtung ab, nicht jedoch in Ost-West-Richtung. Poyang ist Überwinterungsplatz für Vögel aus Nordost­asien und der vorwiegend östlichen Mongolei. Zugbewegungen zwischen Poyang und Qinghai sind nicht bekannt (Martin Williams per e-mail). Somit spricht auch nichts dafür, dass das Virus von Januar/März 2005 bis Mai 2005 durch Zugvögel von Poyang nach Qing­hai gebracht wurde. Ein Krankheitsausbruch in den mutmaßlichen Durchzugs- und Brutge­bieten der 6 Enten (also approximately north of Poyang) is not known. And no one knows if the birds have lived a long time.
were also in southern China since 2004 51.121 samples of healthy appearing poultry gel taken (on markets). 3051 (6.0%) were found with influenza viruses, including 512 (1.0%) with high high pathogenic H5N1.
in 69 in China and found 52 in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam viruses were sequenced to different regional variants ("regionally distinct sublineages), demonstrating the long-term endemicity in these regions. A key mechanism for this is the transmission from poultry. One of the
in Vietnam in May 2005 was different from the viruses isolated before (but after 2003) in Vietnam and Thailand found, but identical to the in of the Chinese province of Guangxi in May 2005 found. Hence, a transport is by Ge-wing concluded.
The diversity of the genotypes of the virus in some southern provinces reflects the transportation routes of birds.
It is concluded that the best way to combat the epidemic is to implement action at source to be set, held on poultry. Early detection and comprehensive slaughter of animals affected war in Süd-Korea, Japan und Hongkong erfolgreich.
- Die Ausbildung von Endemismen spricht gegen die These der Verbreitung von H5N1 durch Zugvögel. Die verschiedenen regionalen Varianten („sublineages“) in Südchina werden als Nachweis für einen anhaltenden Endemismus gesehen. Es ist auch wenig plausibel, dass neue Regionalvarianten durch Zugvögel induziert werden. Dieses scheinen die Autoren selbst erkannt zu haben, da sie die Vielfalt der in den Tierhaltungen vorgefundenen Genoty­pen und Varianten („sublineages“) als Ergebnis der Transporte von Geflügel zwischen den Provinzen ansehen. Bemerkenswert ist die hohe Durchseuchung des Hausgeflügelbestan­des. Für Thailand adopted the preservation and dissemination of the virus by free grazing domestic ducks (Gilbert 2006).
The work of Chen et al. is seen as evidence of the spread of the virus in the wild possibility by wild birds. In fact, they increased but the doubt on this thesis.
include two further studies on the transmission capability of the statements by HPAI mallard ducks (Hulse-Post et al. 2005, Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2005). These have however been conducted in the laboratory, what with field conditions is not comparable (especially physiological strain of wild birds). By the way, this work is often cited that the duck virus to at 17 Day you can retire after infection, which means a doubling to threefold increase previously determined values. The authors themselves say that this is apparently due to the fact that the ducks were infected with a mixture of viruses. And while the organism deals first with the most common virus, another virus type days after gaining the upper hand and lead to a delayed course of infection. In the field, however, would be from the infection with a type of virus must be considered so the disease would have to be there much faster.
The work of Kou et al. (2005) has several H5N1 viruses after in field sparrows. These are in South China Sedentary and therefore can hardly engage in the transmission.
What is left to suspect migratory birds carry the virus over long distances of? Not much, it is still extremely unlikely. There is as yet no species has been demonstrated that carries the virus without becoming sick from it. If there is a disease outbreak in the wild comes, the birds die within a short time. Where on the proportion of infected but not diseased birds apparently (still) no statement GE can be taken. The virus is apparently difficult in the open in a Vogelorganis mechanism einzudringen, denn der Anteil der erkrankten Vögel an den insgesamt in dem jeweiligen Gebiet vorhandenen Vögeln ist meist recht gering. Das Virus verschwindet jedoch so oder so. Folgeausbrüche nach mehreren Wochen oder Monaten sind noch nicht beschrieben worden.
Die völlig mangelhafte Übereinstimmung der Ausbreitungswege von HPAI von Asien nach Eu­ropa (und Afrika) und dem Vogelzug hat Johann Mooij (per e-mail) detailliert dargelegt.
Dies und auch weitere Fragen lassen die These von (nicht selbst erkrankenden) Zugvögeln („Kaskaden-Enten“) als Vektoren noch unwahrscheinlicher werden:
- Warum kommt es nie zu Folgeausbrüchen? Wenn das Virus in einer Wildvogelpopula­tion should survive, should they occur.
- Why are there along the migration routes of the potential long-distance carrier about any disease outbreaks? Whole scattering pattern of crane in outbreaks could be expected.
- Why are found in open country not carriers of the virus (up to 6 top-called ducks, which had probably become infected even)? And in the meantime more than 100,000 samples tested (Martin Williams via e-mail).
- Why are there where the migratory birds from Asia actually fly in the millions, found throughout the winter no outbreaks in the field?
As a result, we all talk about migratory birds as potential vectors of the spread of avian flu has already cost a lot of time. It has a completely irrational in the population caused Pa-nik. It has led to a negative attitude towards the wild birds. The measures against the entry of the disease by migrating birds has urged the small animal husbandry and welfare of poultry in a corner. It is a cynicism that the Mas-sentierhaltung, which for the emergence and spread of HPAI probably responsible, now benefits from the fact that the competition is eliminated.
And the accusation of migratory birds is from the much more probable Pathways and the important question distracted: How is the virus is in the countryside have been introduced? What transport of poultry or poultry products are responsible for this? The seizure of 55 tonnes of poultry meat from China in mid-Janu-ary Antwerp is just a light on the possible trade routes (for more information on the possible dissemination of aquaculture to Europe see Feare 2006).
Clement Steiof
Chen, H. et al. (2006): Establishment of multiple sublineages of H5N1 influenza virus in Asia: Implications for pandemic control. – PNAS 103 (8): 2845-2850. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0511120103
Feare, C.J. (2006): Fish farming and the risk of spread of avian influenza. www.birdlife.org/action/science/species/avian_flu/index.html
Gilbert, M. (2006): Free-grazing Ducks and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza,
Hulse-Post, D.J. (2005): Role of deomestic ducks in the propagation and biological evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses in
Kou, Z. et al. (2005): New Genotype of Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses Isolated from Tree Sparrows in
Spiegel online (9.3.2006): Zugvögel greaten starker unter Verdacht. www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/0,1518,405172,00.html
Sturm-Ramirez, K.M. (2005): Are Ducks Contributing to the Endemicity of Highly Pathogenic H5N1 Influenza Virus in
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